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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3727 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
v. 
 
MARC VINEY, 
            Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-12-cr-00308-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 30, 2014 
 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR. and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: November 6, 2014) 
 
   
 
OPINION*  
   
 
 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Marc Viney was arrested and charged with the armed robbery of the Roo House 
Tavern (“the Tavern”), a bar located in Norristown, Pennsylvania. After a four-day jury 
trial, Viney was convicted of interference with interstate commerce by robbery (“Hobbs 
Act robbery”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), conspiracy to interfere with interstate 
commerce by committing a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and 
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  Viney now raises three issues on appeal, which we address in 
turn.
1
  
First, Viney argues that he should have been granted a judgment of acquittal due 
to insufficient evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and should 
have been granted a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.  In 
reviewing a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, “we view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution and sustain the verdict unless it is clear that no 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”2  The standard is similarly exacting under Rule 33, where a district 
court should order a new trial “only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a 
                                              
 
1
 We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because we 
write for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our conclusion. 
 
2
 United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); 
see also United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 171 (3d Cir. 2011).   
3 
 
miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been 
convicted.”3   
The District Court’s denial of each motion was proper.  The record contains ample 
evidence of Viney’s guilt, including the detailed testimony of the complaining witness, 
Roosevelt Haulcy II (“Haulcy”); Haulcy’s immediate identification of “Marc” as the 
assailant on the day of the crime; Haulcy’s testimony about the firearm used by Viney in 
commission of the crime; and, a document in Viney’s pocket that listed a number of 
individuals’ names, home addresses and automobile descriptions, that had Haulcy’s 
information highlighted in yellow,
 
and that listed, under the header of “Work Tools,” 
assault rifles, handguns, a speed loader, handcuffs, a GPS system and bulletproof vests.
4
    
Moreover, there was sufficient evidence regarding the robbery’s effect on 
interstate commerce, including that Viney stole alcohol produced in France; that the 
Tavern served alcohol produced in France; that the Tavern served alcohol produced in 
other states; and, that the Tavern served customers from outside Pennsylvania.
5
  
Accordingly, finding ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we reject Viney’s Rule 
29 and Rule 33 appeals. 
                                              
 
3
 United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
4
 J.A. 543-47, 679-80. 
 
5
 See, e.g., United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding 
effect on interstate commerce satisfied through testimony that robbed bar in Virgin 
Islands served beer that was brewed in United States); United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 
708, 711-12 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding effect satisfied when business purchased supplies 
from out of state and had some out-of-state customers). 
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Second, Viney argues that requiring only a de minimis effect on interstate 
commerce for Hobbs Act robberies is unconstitutional.  As Viney acknowledges, 
however, our controlling precedent forecloses such an argument.
6
  
Third, Viney argues that our model jury instructions for Hobbs Act robberies are 
unconstitutional, because they instruct a jury that only proof of a de minimis effect is 
necessary to establish the requisite effect on interstate commerce.  We have previously 
considered and rejected this argument.
7
  We do so again here. 
In sum, we conclude that Viney’s conviction was supported by ample evidence, 
and that our precedent on the effect a Hobbs Act robbery need have on interstate 
commerce is well settled.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                              
 
6
 See, e.g., Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711 (holding that “proof of a de minimis effect on 
interstate commerce is all that is required” for purposes of Hobbs Act robbery effect on 
interstate commerce); Walker, 657 F.3d at 180; United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 
780 (3d Cir. 2005).  Contrary to Viney’s suggestion, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), does 
not abrogate our holding in any way.  See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 753 F.3d 845, 
854 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting Sebelius-based challenge to federal child-pornography 
statutes); United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
Sebelius-based challenge to statute which prohibits “convicted felons from possessing a 
firearm in or affecting commerce”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
7
 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 693 F.3d 398, 406-07 (3d Cir. 2012); Urban, 
404 F.3d at 780.   
